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Abstract
A simple model of financial market with rational learning and without friction is
presented in which the value of private information increases with the mass of in-
formed individuals, contrary to the property presented by Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980). The key assumption is the possibility of independent discrete shocks on the
fundamental value and on an exogenous demand.
Key words: Endogenous information, strategic complementarity, financial markets,
aggregation of information.
JEL: G-10.
1 Introduction
Private information about the fundamental value of an asset is valuable because
it increases the profit from trading that arises from the gap between the agent’s
expected value of the asset and its market price. When more agents are informed,
the market price should reflect that information, thus reducing the gap between
private information and public price, and the value of private information. This
mechanism is “common sense” but there cannot be a general proof of it. Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) described that effect as a conjecture (the second among seven),
but they merely illustrate it through an example in the CARA-Gauss model. The
present paper provides another example of a financial market. In that example, the
conjecture is false: an increase of private information may increase its value. Ther
property will have a simple interpretation.
The issue is particularly relevant if private information is endogenous and can be
obtained at some cost. If the value of information for an informed agent increases with
information gathering of other agents, the strategic complementarity may generate
multiple equilibria and sudden switches between market regimes of low information
gathering and trading volume, and regimes of frenzies in information and trading.
Private information is spread in a financial market through the flow of trade, and this
flow must contain some noise (because of the no-trade theorem). The value of private
information depends on the difference between the fundamental and the market price.
In the CARA-Gauss model, both the trade of the informed agents and the noise have
a Gaussian distribution. A higher mass of informed agents increases the signal to
noise ratio in the observed order flow, the market price is a better signal of the
fundamental and the value of information decreases. A similar mechanism operates
for “standard” single-peaked distributions. If there are more informed agents, large
volumes of observed trades will be attributed more to informed agents when the tails
of the noise distribution are decreasing, and the market will be more informative.
When quantum jumps of the fundamental or the noise trade, the single-peaked as-
sumption is not appropriate. The possibility of such jumps is the essential assumption
here. When there are not too many informed agents, moderate trades carry their
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usual information function and large trades are dismissed as being driven by a noise
shock. In this case, a higher number of informed agent increases the signal to noise
ratio and lowers the value of private information. However, if the number of informed
agents keeps rising, then a large trade by informed agents may become confused with
a noise shock. The signal to noise ratio falls and the value of private information
rises. A model of this effect is presented here1.
2 The model
The payoff of the asset (the fundamental) is equal to θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}, with θ1 < θ2. We
normalize θ0 = 0, θ1 = 1, but the notation {θ1, θ2} will be useful for the text. The
high state θ = θ2 has a prior probability µθ.
Three types of non-atomistic agents trade in a one-period perfectly competitive mar-
ket for the asset.
• An exogenous demand is equal to ζ + η where ζ ∈ {ζ1, ζ2}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that ζ1 = 0 and ζ2 = 1. The impact of this normalization
will be discussed later. The probability of ζ = 1 is µζ .
• Second, there is a continuum of mass I of informed agents who know the value of
θ. They are risk-neutral but constrained in their trade. The trade constraints
are normalized such that an agent cannot trade more than one unit of the
asset, in absolute value2. Hence, each agent trades 2θ− 1, and the demand by
informed agents is I(2θ − 1).
• Third, there is a large mass of uninformed agents who are risk-neutral.
As is well known, the information conveyed by the market equilibrium is equivalent
ot the observtion of the order flow which is the sum of the demands of the informed
and the noise traders. This order flow is equal to
y(θˆ, ζˆ, η) = I(2θˆ − 1) + ζˆ + η, (1)
where (θˆ, ζˆ) is the true state.
1 It seems that the present model is the first one to show how strategic complementarity in
information can arise solely through the observation of the price in a frictionless financial market
with fully rational agents who trade for the long-term. In Froot et al. (1992), the value of some
private signal increases with the number of agents owning the signal, but there is a friction in the
market where the price does not fully reflect the information generated by trades. Trade for the
short-term will be discussed later.
2One could also consider a constraint on the monetary value of the transaction.
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Because of the risk-neutral uninformed agents, the equilibrium price is such that
p = E[θ|y] = P (θ = θ2|y)(θ2 − θ1) + θ1. (2)
Let pi(θ, ζ) be the prior probability of (θ, ζ), and µ(θ, ζ|y) this probability (belief)
after the observation of the equilibrium price. Since η has a Gaussian distribution,
the post equilibrium belief can be written
µ(θ, ζ|y; I) = Aexp
(
− 1
2σ2
(y − I(2θ − 1)− ζ)2
)
pi(θ, ζ), (3)
where the constant A is determined such that the sum of the probabilities is equal
to one and y is determined by (1).
Substituting in (3) y by its expression in (1) of y in (3), the posterior distribution
over (θ, ζ) is given by
µ(θ, ζ|θˆ, ζˆ, η; I) = Aexp
(
− 1
2σ2
(
2I(θˆ − θ) + ζˆ − ζ + η
)2)
pi(θ, ζ), (4)
and from (2), using here θ1 = 0, θ2 = 1, the price of the asset is
p(θˆ, ζˆ, η; I) = µ(θ2, ζ2|θˆ, ζˆ, η; I) + µ(θ2, ζ1|θˆ, ζˆ, η; I). (5)
In computing the value of information, before the market opens, the agent knows
that two possibilities may arise.
• If he will learn that the true state is θˆ = θ2 (with the prior probability µθ ),
then he will buy one unit of the asset (up to his constraint), and get a profit
of 1−p(θˆ2, ζˆ, η; I). The price p(θˆ2, ζˆ, η; I) depends on the independent random
variables ζˆ and η. The first is binary and equal to ζ2 with probability µζ , and
η has the density φ(η). Taking the expectation over all possible realizations of
(ζ, η) and using (5), the expected profit, contingent on learning that θ = θ2, is
equal to
B(I) =
∫ (
1− µζp(θ2, ζ2, η; I)− (1− µζ)p(θ2, ζ1, η; I)
)
dφ(η)dη.
• If the agent will learn that the true state is θˆ = θ1, then he will sell one unit
of the asset and get a profit equal to its price p(θˆ1, ζˆ, η; I) which depends on
the random variables ζˆ and η. As in the previous case, the agent computes the
expectation of the profits for this stragegy.
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Summing over the two possible events θˆ = θˆ2, θˆ = θˆ1, with probabilities µθ and
1− µθ respectively, the value of information is a function of I that is defined by
V (I) = µθ
∫ (
1− µζp(θ2, ζ2, η; I)− (1− µζ)p(θ2, ζ1, η; I)
)
dφ(η)dη
+(1− µθ)
∫ (
µζp(θ1, ζ2, η; I) + (1− µζ)p(θ1, ζ1, η; I)
)
φ(η)dη.
Let us consider first the case where the mass of informed agents takes an “interme-
diate value”, here I = 1/4. The difference between the order flow of informed agents
in the low and the high state is equal to 1/2, which is half of the difference between
the mean of the distribution of the demand with and without shock respectively. If
a jump of the order flow is driven by information about the fundamental, its value
is 1/2, whereas if it is driven by a demand shock, its value will be around 1. When
the variance of the noise term η is small, the two shocks which are independent, can
be well (but not perfectly) separated by the order flow in equilibrium. The market
price is on average close to the fundamental. That is the meaning of the next result.
Proposition 1
If I = 1/4, the price is close to the fundamental in the following sense: for any
α > 0,  > 0, there exists σ∗ such that if σ < σ∗,
P (|p(θ, ζ, η; 1
4
)− θ| > α) < ,
where the probability P is measured with the prior distribution on (θ, ζ, η).
Proof: We omit the variable I (which is equal to 1/4) from the arguments of µ and
p in their expressions (6) and (5). The posterior belief takes the form
µ(θ, ζ|θˆ, ζˆ, η) = Aexp
(
− 1
2σ2
(
z(θ, ζ; θˆ, ζˆ) + η
)2)
pi(θ, ζ), with
z(θ, ζ; θˆ, ζˆ) = 0.5(θˆ − θ) + ζˆ − ζ.
(6)
For (θ, ζ) 6= (θˆ, ζˆ), and since z(θˆ, ζˆ; θˆ, ζˆ) = 0,
µ(θ, ζ|θˆ, ζˆ, η)
µ(θˆ, ζˆ|θˆ, ζˆ, η) = Aexp
(
−z(θ, ζ; θˆ, ζˆ)
σ2
(z(θ, ζ, θˆ, ζˆ)
2
+ η
))
.
If for some β > 0,
µ(ζ, ζ|θˆ, ζˆ, η)
µ(ζˆ, ζˆ|θˆ, ζˆ, η) > β, (7)
then for some β′ > 0 ∣∣∣z(θ, ζ; θˆ, ζˆ)
σ2
(z(θ, ζ, θˆ, ζˆ)
2
+ η
)∣∣∣ < β′. (8)
4
There exists a strictly positive M such that |z(θ, ζ; θˆ, ζˆ)| > M over all (θ, ζ; θˆζˆ) with
(θ, ζ) 6= (θˆ, ζˆ) (since there are 12 such values), and (8) implies that
|z(θ, ζ; θˆ, ζˆ)
2σ
+
η
σ
| < σ β
′
M
,
By a similar argument, there is A and σ∗1 such that if σ < σ∗1,
|η
σ
| > A
σ
. (9)
The random variable η/σ is Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 1. Hence, for any
 > 0, there exists σ∗ < σ∗1 such that if σ > σ∗2, P (|η/σ|) < . (Choose σ∗ < σ∗1 such
that 2(1− F (A/σ∗)) < ).
If (7) applies for any (θ, ζ) 6= (θˆ, ζˆ) then, because the sum of the probabilities of all
(θ, ζ) is equal to one,
µ(θ, ζ|θˆ, ζˆ, η) < β
3β + 1
< β, and µ(θˆ, ζˆ|θˆ, ζˆ, η) > 1− 3β. (10)
Recall that these inequalities hold for any (θ, ζ, θˆ, ζˆ) and over a set of η of probability
at least 1− .
Since the price is given by p(θˆ, ζˆ, η) = µ(θˆ, ζ2|θˆ, ζˆ, η) +µ(θˆ, ζ2|θˆ, ζˆ, η), under previous
inequality,
P
(
|p− θˆ| < 4β
)
> 1− .
The proof is concluded by choosing β = α/4, where α is the parameter in the
proposition.
Proposition 1 shows that when the variance of the noise term η is sufficiently small,
the price is arbitrarily close to the fundamental with a probability arbitrarily close
to one. Since the payoff of information rests on the difference between the price
and the fundamental, the value of information must be arbitrarily small. From
Proposition 1, and since the gain from trade is bounded by 1, it follows immediately
that V (1/4) < α+  where α and  are arbitarily small.
Proposition 2
For any γ > 0, there exists σ∗ such that if σ < σ∗, V (1/4) < γ.
We now consider the case where the mass of informed agents is 1/2. Since in equi-
librium, the net demand of an informed agent (who is perfectly informed) does not
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depend on the mass I of informed agents, the total net demand of these agents is
proportional to I. When I = 1/2, a shift of θ from θ1 to θ2 increases by one the
demand of the informed and this impact on the order flow is the same as the impact
of an exogenous demand shock from ζ1 to ζ2. The two shocks cannot be separated
by the observation of the order flow when only one of them occurs. The market
price remains bounded away from 0 or 1 if the variance σ2 of the noise η becomes
arbitrarily small and private information retains a value bounded away from zero.
This argument is formalized in the next result.
Proposition 3 V (1/2) >
2µθµz(1− µθ)(1− µz)
µθ(1− µζ) + (1− µθ)µζ .
Proof: The profit from trading by a non-informed agent is based on the observation
of the variable y given in (1), which, when I = 1/2, is equivalent to y′ = y + 0.5 =
θˆ + ζˆ + η. His (maximum) expected profit is zero. The signal y′ is less informative
than the signal θˆ + ζˆ in the sense of Blackwell (1951). If an agent could observe the
signal θˆ+ ζˆ without the garble η, and trade at the equilibrium price (5), his expected
profit would be strictly positive. The value of information is the difference between
the expected profit from trade by an informed agent and the non-informed agent.
Therefore, this value is bounded below by the difference between the expected trade
profit of an informed agent and an agent who observes θˆ + ζˆ.
The agent who observes θˆ + ζˆ has perfect information in the states (1, 1) and (0, 0).
Hence, we can restrict the comparaison with the payoff of the perfectly informed
agent to the states with θˆ 6= ζˆ.
V (
1
2
) > µθ(1− µz)
(
1− P (θˆ = 1|θˆ + ζˆ = 1)
)
+ (1− µθ)µζP (θˆ = 1||θˆ + ζˆ = 1).
By application of Bayes’ rule,
P (θˆ = 1|θˆ + ζˆ = 1) = (1− µζ)µθ
(1− µζ)µθ + µζ(1− µθ) .
Substituting in the previous expression, one finds the inequality in Proposition 3.
The next result follows immediately from the previous propositions.
Theorem 1
Let V (I) be the value of information (before the market opens). There exists σ¯ such
that if σ < σ¯, V (1/4) < V (1/2), and the value of information is increasing in some
interval contained in (0, 1).
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An example
The function V (I) is computed numerically and represented for four values of the
variance parameter σ in Figure 1. Propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated by the case
σ = 0.02 : when I is in some range between 0 and 1/2, the order flow provides very
good information on the fundamental and the value of information is very small,
not distinguishable from 0 in the figure. Following Proposition 3 and given the
parameters of the example, for all values of σ, V (1/2) > 0.21. When I = 0, the
market provides no information, and information has its maximum value. When I
increases from 0, the market provides some information, and the value of private
information must be decreasing from its maximum. If σ is sufficiently small, the ex
ante value of information may decrease to a very low level. But if I increases toward
1/2, the market provides less information when only one shock occurs and the value
of information increases. In the region I > 1/2, the case is similar to the one for
small I and V (I) is decreasing.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Mass of Informed
Value of information
sigma=0.02
sigma=0.15
sigma=0.235
sigma=0.5
Parameters: µθ = µζ = 0.7.
Figure 1: The value of information as a function of the mass of informed agents
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Conclusion
The result of the paper was established for normalized values of the discrete changes,
but its extension to arbitary values of the jumps is a trivial exercise. The main as-
sumption for the argument of the paper is the possibility of independent quantum
jumps in both the fundamental and the exogenous demand. When quantum jumps
are restricted to either the fundamental or the exogenous demand, the standard
property of a decreasing value of information seems to hold. The mechanism that
generates here the strategic complementarity in information acquisition is simple. It
remains to be seen if other mechanisms could generate such a strategic complemen-
tarity when agents trade in a frictionless market for the long-term, that is to hold
until the revelation of the fundamental. As shown in Chamley (2007) in a model
with a Gaussian distribution of noise, when agents trade for the short-term and hold
their position for a limited amount of time, strategic complementarity may hold.
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